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 2 The Ideal and the Real 
 In this chapter we fi rst attempt to persuade (or remind) the reader that much health-
care departs from the care envisaged by standards and guidelines. We appreciate 
that standards and guidelines need considerable interpretation and adaptation for 
patients with multiple conditions (Tinetti et al.  2004 ) and that even the simplest 
conditions require consideration of personal preferences and other factors. However 
we are concerned primarily with the basic fact that the care provided to patients 
often does not reach the standard that professionals intend to deliver and which 
professional consensus would regard as reasonable and achievable. Clinical pro-
cesses and systems are often unreliable and in fact many patients are harmed by the 
healthcare intended to help them. All this is to some degree obvious to anyone who 
works at the frontline or studies healthcare deeply. One of the questions we address 
in this book is how to manage the gap between the ‘real and the ideal’ and how best 
to manage the risks to patients. 
 Many factors conspire to make optimal care both diffi cult to defi ne and diffi cult 
to achieve (Box  2.1 ). The vulnerabilities of the system, personal attitudes, team 
dynamics and a variety of external pressures and restraints combine to produce a 
‘migration’ away from best practice. This in turn means that clinical staff are 
engaged in constant adaptation, detecting problems and responding to them. Safety 
is in a very real sense achieved by frontline practitioners rather than imposed by 
standards. We will develop this further in later chapters to argue that safety strate-
gies to manage these risks need to foster these adaptive capacities both at an indi-
vidual and organisational level. 
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 The Day-to-Day Realities of Healthcare 
 When we are working we are usually preoccupied with the task in hand and do not 
have the attentional capacity to simultaneously refl ect on the working environment 
or remember all the diffi culties encountered during the day. Furthermore, we are not 
easily able to aggregate our experience over long time periods. For instance, a doc-
tor may know that notes are often missing in the clinic but will struggle to estimate 
how often this happens over a year. In addition it is very diffi cult for individuals to 
gain a true understanding of the failures and vulnerabilities across an entire techni-
cal area. Patients and families have a privileged view in that they alone follow the 
full story of care but our view as patients is obviously partial in that we cannot know 
the wider workings of the hospital or clinic. All these factors combine to make it 
diffi cult for any individual to monitor or assess the overall standard of care. There is 
however ample evidence to support the simple idea that care often falls below the 
standard expected. Let us consider some examples. 
 Comparing Actual Care with the Care Intended by Guidelines 
 Major studies in both the United States and Australia suggest that patients typically 
receive only a proportion of the care indicated by guidelines. Studies in the United 
States suggest that many patients received only about half of recommended care, 
though other patients receive investigations and treatment that are unnecessary 
(McGlynn et al.  2003 ). In a major recent Australian study adult patients received only 
57 % of recommended care with compliance ranging from 13 % for alcohol depen-
dence to 90 % for coronary artery disease (Runciman et al.  2012 ). These studies did not 
assess the direct impact on the patients concerned, but other studies have linked failures 
in the care provided with subsequent harm. For instance Taylor and colleagues ( 2008 ) 
 Box 2.1 Observation of Patients at Risk of Suicide: When Working Conditions 
Make It Difﬁ cult to Follow Procedures 
 Over a 1 year period there were on average 18 suicides by in-patients under 
observation per year in hospitals in the United Kingdom. Ninety-one percent of 
deaths occurred when patients were under level 2 (intermittent) observation. 
 Deaths under observation tended to occur when policies or procedures 
(including times between observations) were not followed, for example:
•  When staff are distracted by other events on the ward 
•  At busy periods, such as between 7.00 and 9.00 
•  When there are staff shortages 
•  When ward design impedes observation. 
 National Confi dential Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide by People with 
Mental Illness ( 2015 ) 
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interviewed 228 patients during and after their treatment and found 183 service quality 
defi ciencies, each of which more than doubled the risk of any adverse event or close 
call for that patient. Service quality defi ciencies involving poor coordination of care 
were particularly associated with the occurrence of adverse events and medical errors. 
In another example physicians reviewed 1566 case notes from 20 English Hospitals 
writing judgment-based comments on the phases of care provided and on care overall. 
About a fi fth of the patients were considered to have received less than satisfactory 
care, often experiencing a series of adverse events (Hutchinson et al.  2013 ). 
 Reliability of Clinical Systems in the British NHS 
 Some healthcare processes, such as the administration of radiotherapy, achieve very 
high levels of reliability. Other processes are haphazard to say the least. Burnett and 
colleagues ( 2012 ) examined the reliability of four clinical systems in the NHS: clin-
ical information in surgical outpatient clinics, prescribing for hospital inpatients, 
equipment in theatres, and insertion of peripheral intravenous lines. Reliability was 
defi ned as 100 % fault free operation when, for example, every patient had the 
required information available at the time of their appointment. 
 Reliability was found to be between 81 and 87 % for the systems studied, with 
signifi cant variation between organisations for some systems; the clinical systems 
therefore failed on 13–19 % of occasions. This implies, if these fi ndings are typical, 
that in an English hospital: doctors are coping with missing clinical information in 
three of every 20 outpatient appointments and there is missing or faulty equipment 
in one of seven operations performed. In each case where measured, about 20 % of 
reliability failures were associated with a potential risk of harm. On this basis it is 
hardly surprising that patient safety is routinely compromised in NHS hospitals and 
that clinical staff come to accept poor reliability as part of everyday life. 
 Following the Rules: Reliability of Human Behaviour 
 Delivering safe, high quality care is an interplay between disciplined, regulated behav-
iour and necessary adaptation and fl exibility. Rules and procedures are never a com-
plete solution to safety and sometimes it is necessary to depart from standard procedures 
in the pursuit of safety. However, protocols for routine tasks are standardised and speci-
fi ed precisely because those tasks are essential to safe, high quality care. 
 Protocols of this kind are equivalent to the safety rules of other industries – 
defi ned ways of behaving when carrying out safety-critical tasks (Hale and Swuste 
 1998 ). Examples in healthcare include: checking equipment, washing your hands, 
not prescribing dangerous drugs when you are not authorised to, following the pro-
cedures when giving intravenous drugs and routinely checking the identity of a 
patient. Such standard routines and procedures are the bedrock of a safe organisa-
tion, but there is ample evidence that such rules are routinely ignored:
•  Hand washing. Contamination through hand contact is a major source and hand 
hygiene a major weapon in the fi ght against infection (Burke  2003 ). Studies have 
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found that average levels of compliance, before major campaigns were insti-
tuted, have varied from 16 to 81 % (Pittet et al.  2004 ). 
•  Intravenous drug administration. Studies have found that over half involve an error, 
either in the preparation of the drug or its administration. Typical errors were pre-
paring the wrong dose or selecting the wrong solvent (Taxis and Barber  2003 ). 
•  Prophylaxis against infection and embolism. Only 55 % of surgical patients 
receive antimicrobial prophylaxis (Bratzler et al.  2005 ) and only 58 % of those at 
risk of venous thromboembolism receive the recommended preventive treatment 
(Cohen et al.  2008 ). 
 The causes of departure from standards are many. In some settings the working 
environment is reasonably calm and orderly so staff are able to follow clear proto-
cols and abide by core standards. In other settings however the pressures are great, 
the environment noisy and chaotic and staff are essentially just trying to do the best 
they can in the circumstances. In any systems there are pressures for greater produc-
tivity, less use of resources and occasions where missing or broken equipment 
forces adaptations and short cuts; add to this that we all, occasionally or frequently, 
are in a rush to get home, get on to the next case, tired or stressed and apt to cut 
corners. Standards may be unrealistic or too complex; staff may not be suffi ciently 
skilled or have not received the necessary training. Working in such conditions is an 
everyday occurrence for many clinicians and acts as a constant reminder of the care 
they would like to give and the reality of the care they are able to provide. Over time 
however these departures from standards can become increasingly tolerated and 
eventually invisible (Box  2.2 ). 
 Box 2.2 External Pressures and Gradual Migration to the Boundary of Safety 
 Occasional lapses can become more tolerated over time and systems can 
become gradually more degraded and eventually dangerous. The phrase ‘ille-
gal normal’ captures the day-to-day reality of many systems in which devia-
tions from standard procedures (the illegal) are widespread but occasion no 
particular alarm (they become normal). The concept of routine violations is 
not part of the thinking of managers and regulators; in truth it is a very uncom-
fortable realisation that much of the time systems, whether healthcare, trans-
port or industry, operate in an ‘illegal-normal’ zone. The system continues in 
this state because the violations have considerable benefi ts, both for the indi-
viduals concerned and for managers who may tolerate them, or even encour-
age them, in the drive to meet productivity standards. 
 Over time these violations can become more frequent and more severe so 
that the whole system ‘migrates’ to the boundaries of safety. Violations are 
now routine and so common as to be almost invisible to both workers and 
managers. The organisation has now become accustomed to operating at the 
margins of safety. At this stage, any further deviance may easily result in 
patient harm, and would generally be considered as negligent or reckless con-
duct (Amalberti et al.  2006 ). 
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 The Ideal and the Real: Five Levels of Care 
 We now consider the implications of the gap between the care envisaged by stan-
dards and guidelines and the care actually given to patients. We have found it useful 
to distinguish fi ve levels of care each departing further from the ideal and, we sug-
gest, increasing probability of harm as one moves down the levels.
 1.  Level 1 corresponds to optimal care envisaged by standards (though truly opti-
mal care can never be encapsulated in standards). These standards are set out by 
national and professional organisations and represent a consensus on what can 
be regarded as the optimum care achievable within current cost constraints. This 
level provides a shared ideal reference of excellent care, although it is seldom 
fully achieved across an entire patient journey. 
 2.  Level 2 represents a standard of care which experts would judge as both provid-
ing a good outcome for the patient and also achievable in day to day practice. 
The care is of good standard and the outcome is good, even though there may be 
minor variations and problems. Any departures from best practice are relatively 
unimportant in the overall care provide to the patient. 
 3.  Level 3 represents the fi rst level where the safety of the patient may be compro-
mised. We consider, for reasons given above, that a considerable amount of the 
healthcare that patients receive falls broadly into this category. At this level there 
are frequent departures from best practice which occur for a wide variety of dif-
ferent reasons and are a potential threat to patients. There may for example not 
be a timely monitoring of anticoagulation level after prescription of heparin. 
This level has been previously described as the ‘illegal normal’ (Amalberti et al. 
 2006 ) (Box  2.2 ). 
 4.  Level 4 represents a departure from standards which is suffi cient to produce 
avoidable harm. For example, a 68 year old patient undergoes a cholecystectomy 
and contracts a urinary catheter infection after surgery. Analysis of the event 
showed that the catheter was not checked regularly and was left in place too 
long. This was a clear departure from expected care. However treatment was 
rapidly instituted and the infection was under full control after 10 days. The 
patient suffered avoidable harm and had to stay in hospital an additional week 
but then recovered completely. 
 5.  Level 5 refers to care that is poor over a longer period and places the patient at 
risk of substantial and enduring harm. For instance if, in the case described 
above, the patient not only contracted the infection but it was then not recognised 
and not treated effectively. This would result in at best a very prolonged recovery 
and increased frailty but also a potentially fatal outcome. 
 Broadly speaking we see Level 1 as optimal care, certainly a valuable aspiration 
and inspiration but very diffi cult to achieve in practice and in many settings not easy 
to defi ne. Optimal care is relatively easy to specify in a highly standardised and struc-
tured clinical setting but in many environments, particularly primary care, the care 
provided necessarily evolves and unfolds in a complex social context (Box  2.3 ). 
Level 2 is a more realistic level of care where there are minor imperfections but 
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clinical care is of a very good standard. Level 3 is a distinct deterioration with mul-
tiple lapses of care but not suffi cient to greatly affect long term outcome. Levels 4 
and 5 in contrast offer potential for harm, either through omission of critical aspects 
of care, serious errors or neglect. In the common understanding of these terms the 
ambitions of high quality care are associated with Levels 1 and 2, and those con-
cerned with safety aiming to avoid levels 4 and 5. 
 Figure  2.1 is similar to many diagrams which represent variation in standards of 
care and which distinguish good, average and poor units or organisations. Certainly 
some organisations deliver poor care for sustained periods of time and even national 
services can have periods of high risk of harm at times of crisis. However we intend 
to capture a more fl uid reality in which any patient is at risk of a sudden decline in 
standards, and at risk of harm, on many occasions during their healthcare journey. 
Safety can be eroded quite suddenly in any team or organisation, just as there is 
always some risk of accident with the safest car driven by the best driver on the saf-
est road. We are therefore not only concerned with strategies which may support 
struggling teams or organisations but also with developing strategies and interven-
tions to manage risk on a day-to-day basis.
 The Cumulative Impact of Poor Quality Care 
 Patients can receive some treatment of poor quality, in the sense of haphazard and 
patchy adherence to accepted standards, and still not come to any harm. We suggest, 
however, harm is much more probable when healthcare moves further from best 
 Box 2.3 Optimal Care Can Often Not Be Precisely Deﬁ ned 
 There are many clinical situations in which optimal care cannot be precisely 
defi ned. This may be because the disease is not well understood, is rare or 
expressed in an unusual manner. More commonly though the patient, often 
frail or elderly, is suffering from a number of different conditions presenting a 
complicated and changing picture. In these cases, common in primary care and 
mental health, clinical judgement and sensitive shared decisions are to the fore:
 I don’t believe that in much of what we do in healthcare, particularly in primary care, 
we can defi ne what we mean by ‘excellence’, nor can we codify it though guidelines 
and standards. We can reduce health provision to its component parts and pretend 
that these refl ect the whole but this ignores the inherent paradoxes of competing 
goods and trade-offs with other objectives. The thinking that dominates the safety 
world is sometimes too rational. What I see is lots of thoughtful clinicians who 
understand the discrepancy between the ideal and the real, for whom the tension is 
always on their agenda and who thoughtfully manage these tensions because they 
accept that they live in a world that wants to simplify (M Marshall, 2015, personal 
communication) 
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practice (Levels 4 and 5). This is partly because obvious lapses in standards (such 
as not checking patient identity) may lead to immediate harm but the greater danger 
to patients probably comes from the cumulative impact of minor problems 
(Hutchinson et al.  2013 ). 
 Suppose for example, a fi t and well 26 year old patient has planned abdominal 
surgery for infl ammatory bowel disease on a Wednesday. Due to a shortage of beds, 
the patient is placed on the orthopaedic ward, with nurses, pharmacists and other 
clinicians who are not used to looking after this type of problem. The operation is 
diffi cult and complex; a piece of bowel was removed and a new join made between 
the remaining ends of the bowel. On Saturday evening the patient has an episode of 
fever at 39 °C and abdominal pain, which could indicate that the new join is leaking. 
The young doctor on duty over the weekend is a locum, who does not know the 
patient. She tries to read the operation note but it is not completely legible. She does 
not appreciate the potential seriousness and does not seek more senior advice. Over 
the next 24 h the patient continues to deteriorate but the staff do not appreciate the 
signifi cance of the symptoms. By Monday morning the patient is so unwell that he 
suffers a cardiac arrest and eventually dies on Monday evening after a futile return 
to the operating theatre during the day. 
 This scenario describes a series of relatively ordinary and commonplace lapses, 
omissions and events which together have a catastrophic effect. Clearly there were 
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problems in assessment of symptoms, escalation, record keeping, communication, 
coordination of care and management of bed availability, possibly exacerbated by 
external pressures. None of the individual lapses and problems is out of the ordinary 
or particularly shocking – but they combine to create catastrophe. 
 The impact of the cumulative effects of poor care suggests that we may need to 
widen the time frame of analyses of adverse events and poor outcomes. This will be 
especially important once we consider safety in the home and community and in the 
context of the overall impact of healthcare on a person’s life and well-being. However 
we may also see a much greater incidence of harm due to cumulative minor failure in 
the future owing to the number and complexity of transitions along the patient 
journey. 
 Consideration of the cumulative effects of poor care also has implications for 
how we assess priorities for patient safety. Dramatic incidents, such as deaths 
from spinal injection of vincristine (Franklin et al.  2014 ), attract considerable 
attention and are tragic for the people involved but they tend to skew the direction 
of patient safety initiatives towards comparatively rare events. In surgery the cases 
that attract most attention are those with sudden, dramatic outcomes with fairly 
immediate causes. These are incidents such as operating on the wrong patient or 
retained foreign body which are rare but frequently disastrous when they do occur; 
they are low risk but ‘high dread’ in the language of the psychology of risk. 
However surgical patients run much greater risks from care that is simply of poor 
standard for whatever reason. There is for instance a huge variation in mortality 
from surgery across Europe. In a major recent review 46,539 patients were studied 
of whom 1855 (4 %) died before hospital discharge (Pearse et al.  2012 ). Crude 
mortality rates varied widely between countries range from 1.2 % for Iceland to 
21.5 % for Latvia. Substantial differences remained even after adjustment for 
confounding variables. This suggests that much of the care provided is, in our 
terms, of levels 3, 4 and 5 even by the standards of individual countries. Once we 
begin to see safety in these terms it is clear that the harm from poor management 
of post-operative complications dwarfs the much more prominent problem of sur-
gical never events. 
 We need therefore to refl ect on the broader priorities from a population health 
perspective. This process has already begun with the increased attention given to 
programmes to reduce falls, pressure ulcers, acute kidney injury and infections of all 
kinds. The scope of patient safety needs to further expand to embrace consideration 
of poor care of all kinds and to integrate with those seeking to understand and reduce 
the sources of variability. We should also remember that most studies at the hospital 
level focus on one particular type of adverse event (such as hospital acquired infec-
tion) or one service (such as surgery). Very few studies assess the whole spectrum of 
incidents affl icting patients or assess their cumulative impact over time. 
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 Explicit Discussion of the Real Standard of Care Is Critical 
 We now come to a central problem and challenge which is that the standard of 
usual care cannot easily be explicitly discussed. It is of course understood implic-
itly within clinical teams and each new member is socialised into accepting the 
standards of care in that particular environment which may be either higher, or 
lower, than they are used to. When people join a unit, or spend time in another 
unit, there may be a sudden shock of recognition of a very different standard and 
tolerance for departures from standards. There is huge variation in different clini-
cal teams in what they regard as good enough care which is infl uenced by the 
social norms and values of that particular setting. Care that is viewed as ordinary 
on one ward might be seen as being a major lapse in standards on another. Most 
clinicians are aware that much care is in the ‘illegal normal’ range and immedi-
ately recognise this concept when it is presented. They know that the care they 
provide often falls short of the care they would like to provide but they are adept 
at navigating the healthcare system to provide the best care they can in the 
circumstances. 
 Organisations however, and still more governments, cannot easily openly say 
that much care is at level 3 and routinely dips to levels 4 and 5. This has some 
important consequences for the management of risk. First, it becomes very diffi cult 
to study or to value the many adaptive ways in which staff cope in diffi cult environ-
ment to prevent harm coming to patients. Second, and most important to our argu-
ments, attempts to improve safety may not be targeting the right levels or the right 
behaviours. We will argue later that most safety interventions are essentially 
attempts to improve reliability and, ultimately, to move all care towards Level 1. 
This is an important and necessary strategy but, in our view, only applicable in some 
circumstances. This approach need to be supplemented by strategies that aim to 
maintain care at Level 3 and prevent decay into levels 4 and 5. We might express 
this by saying that in the day to day provision of care it is more urgent that our sys-
tems prioritise achieving reliable basic standards than striving for unachievable ide-
als. If care is generally at Level 3 then the principal aim might be to improve 
reliability and move to Level 2. If however care is often at level 4 or 5, that is frankly 
dangerous, then the detection and response to potential dangers might be a higher 
priority (Fig.  2.2 ).
 The aspirations to excellence are important and should not be mocked or derided 
as unrealistic. The problem is that the rhetoric of excellence masks the urgently 
needed discussion of the realities of ‘usual care’. If our aspiration becomes only to 
deliver ‘good enough’ care then there is a danger of increased variation, declining 
standards and increased hazard. The defi nition and aspiration of optimum quality 
remains critical – but so does an explicit discussion of the current reality. 
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 What Is the Impact of Improving Quality Standards? 
 Innovation and the aspiration to continually improve are at the heart of medicine. 
However the introduction of new treatments or new standards of care may place 
unrealistic demands on both staff and organisations. Stroke for example was at one 
time regarded as untreatable. Brain cells were thought to die within minutes after a 
stroke began, and medical treatment largely consisted of caring for the patient and 
“wait and see”. We have known for a decade now that treatment following a stroke, 
especially if begun within 3 h of onset, can preserve brain tissue. Guidelines typi-
cally recommend a door-to-needle time of 60 min. However in 2011 only one third 
of American patients were treated within the guideline-recommended door-to- 
needle times (Fonarow et al.  2013 ). Many countries have instituted major pro-
grammes to improve the effi ciency of treatment for stroke which have led to great 
improvements in outcome. 
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 We are not criticising the care given or the delays in bringing in new standards of 
delivery. Rather we are pointing to the inevitable increase in departures from guide-
lines which result when a new standard is specifi ed. Ten years ago there would have 
been few ‘incidents’ relating to failures in the early treatment of stroke because 
standards of care had not been introduced. We can now, because of improved care, 
point to numerous serious incidents because many patients cannot access to care 
within the 3 h of onset due to a failures in the healthcare system. As standards 
improve we are therefore likely to have an increasing number of incidents which are 
concerned with omissions of care. What counts as an ‘incident’ in 2015 may simply 
have been ordinary practice in 2005; this is a very common consideration in legal 
cases which are being decided some years after the initial event. The new standards, 
hugely benefi cial for patients, create new kinds of incidents and safety problems 
(Vincent and Amalberti  2015 ). 
 Levels of Care and Strategies for Safety Improvement 
 Improving the standard of care delivered and the gradual setting of higher standards 
is of course a positive and necessary aspiration. However when doing this we need 
to recognise that we are redefi ning both quality and safety and increasing the pres-
sure on individuals and organisations. Champions of the new standards will emerge 
and bring about change but many organisations will take time to meet the new stan-
dard and weaker organisations may even be destabilised because of the increasing 
demand. 
 We have at present very few strategies for managing the transitional period or for 
responding constructively to the inevitable gap between expected standards and 
organisational reality. During these transition periods we will need to do more than 
simply exhort and harass organisations to meet the new standards. We must also 
recognise the inevitable lag and employ strategies that emphasise the detection of 
problems, awareness of conditions which degrade safety and individual and enhance 
team based management of potentially harmful care. These arguments will be fully 
developed in Chap.  7 . 
Levels of Care and Strategies for Safety Improvement
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 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 Key Points 
•  Many patients do not receive the care intended. We can do a great deal to 
increase reliability and achieve higher standards of care. However we 
believe that in healthcare there will always be a gap between the ideal and 
the real. 
•  We distinguish fi ve levels of care each departing further from the ideal and, 
we suggest, increasing probability of harm as one move down the levels.
 –  Level 1 corresponds to the optimum care envisaged by standards. This 
level provides a shared reference of excellent care, although it is seldom 
fully achieved across an entire patient journey. 
 –  Level 2 represents a standard of care which experts would judge as both 
providing a good outcome for the patient and also achievable in day to 
day practice 
 –  Level 3 represents the fi rst level in which the safety of the patient is 
threatened. At this level there are frequent departures from best practice 
which occur for a wide variety of different reasons. 
 –  Level 4 represents a departure from standards which is suffi cient to pro-
duce avoidable harm but not suffi cient to substantially affect the overall 
outcome. 
 –  Level 5 refers to care that is poor over a longer period and places the 
patient at risk of substantial and enduring harm. 
•  We suggest that organisations and government fi nd it diffi cult to openly 
discuss the daily threats and variations in standards of care. This has 
important consequences. First, it becomes very diffi cult to study or value 
the many ways staff adapt to prevent harm coming to patients. Second, 
attempts to improve safety may not be targeting the right levels or the right 
behaviours. 
•  The aspirations to excellence are important and should not be derided as 
unrealistic. The problem is that the rhetoric of excellence masks the 
urgently needed explicit discussion of the realities of usual care which is a 
critical fi rst step in the effective management of risk. 
•  We propose that most safety interventions are essentially attempts to 
improve reliability. This is an important and necessary approach but needs 
to be complemented by additional strategies that aim to manage risk and 
protect patients from serious failures in care. 
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